EC-121
operations began in Southeast Asia in the spring of 1965, after two F-105's
were shot down by enemy MIG's while on strike missions over the North.
From this incident the first in which F-105's were lost in air combat it
became clear that early detection and warning of MIG flight activity
were prerequisites to reducing aircraft losses. With the existing
surface based radar net unable to do the job, the Air Force brought in
the EC-121's.
The
EC-121 task force deployed to Southeast Asia early in 1965. It consisted
of 5 aircraft, flight crews, and about 100 support personnel from the
Aerospace Defense Command's 552d Airborne Early Warning and Control Wing
at McClellan AFB, Calif. Its main support base was in Taiwan, but
operations were generally flown from forward bases in South Vietnam or
Thailand, originally Tan Son Nhut, later from Ubon, Udorn, and
eventually Korat, where the task force finally found an in theater home
in October 1967. It was officially designated Detachment 1 (Rotational),
552d Aircraft Early Warning and Control Wing on 30 October 1968.
In
performing what became their primary mission, College Eye airmen
stationed themselves over the Gulf of Tonkin about 50 miles from
Haiphong Harbor, flew elliptical orbits, and passed on information about
North Vietnamese air activity. After Communist China charged in October
1965 and May 1966 that U.S. aircraft had violated its borders, the
EC-121's took on the additional task of tracking and warning all
American aircraft when they were approaching or appeared to be too close
to the Chinese border. For this purpose, task force aircraft flew
orbital patterns over Laos near the Plain of Jars.
The
EC-121 crews undertook a number of other control duties. For example,
from April 1965 to early 1966 and beginning again in late
1967, they controlled four fighters flying protective cover for unarmed
support aircraft operating in the Gulf of Tonkin area. The EC-121's also
(1)
served
as an airborne communications relay center through which aircraft
returning from their targets could transmit strike results and position
reports to the control center at Da Nang; (2) directed operations of
fighter escorts, MIG combat patrols, C-130 flare ships, and A-26 strike
aircraft along the North Vietnamese-Laotian border; (3) provided rescue
and navigational assistance in searches for downed pilots: and (4)
frequently assisted fighters in finding tankers for emergency refueling
In 1967 College Eye controllers also began actively directing USAF F-4
fighters to North Vietnamese MIG's.
Paradoxically,
the EC-121's were called upon only three times to provide one of its
basic services early warning of enemy air attacks against South
Vietnamese ground targets. The first occurred in October 1965 when
intelligence reports indicated a possible IL-28 bomber attack on Da Nang.
The second and possibly most serious threat of the entire war took place
early in February 1968 when 41
L-28's
and 13 MIG's penetrated the DMZ. Upon entering the zone, the fighter
escort broke off, some turning Laotian border, the remainder flying out
to sea. The four Beagles loitered in the DMZ for almost an hour,
then dropped below radar detection altitudes and departed. The third incident
came in mid June 1968, when an enemy helicopter threat appeared to be
building up along the DMZ. In these three instances, night-flying
College Eye crews were able to detect them and alert friendly ground
forces and alert them.